A Comparative Analysis of Secretariats Created under Select Treaty Regimes by Kishore, Pallavi
A Comparative Analysis of Secretariats Created
Under Select Treaty Regimes
DR. PALLAVI KiSHORE*
I. Introduction
The administrative structure of most international organisations includes a secretariat
that plays an important role in the functioning of the entire regime. Secretariats act as the
backbone of the organisations and mainly perform administrative functions. Secretariats
originated with the League of Nations' and continued with the United Nations (UN)
Secretariat, which has provided administrative support since 1945.2 Various secretariats
may perform common or specific functions depending on the aims of the treaty.3
What is a secretariat? There are many definitions. An opinion of the UN Office of
Legal Affairs of November 4, 1993 states, with respect to the Climate Change Conven-
tion, that a secretariat is a supportive structure.4 According to James R. Fox, it is a bu-
reaucracy.5 Loveday compares them with national ministries; of course, international
organisations or Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs) have less power than
national governments.6 According to Sandford, secretariats are executive support systems
of treaties7 or international organisations created by the treaty parties to aid the manage-
ment and implementation of the treaty.8 Per-Olof Busch states with regard to the Cli-
mate Change Secretariat that a secretariat is an "intergovernmental bureaucracy that
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states created to assist them in their cooperative struggle to confront climate change." 9
For Andresen and Skjaerseth, "A secretariat is an international organization established by
the relevant parties to assist them in fulfilling the goal(s) of the treaty."'0 "Such environ-
mental treaty secretariats generally take shape as small intergovernmental bureaucracies
that are run by international civil servants under the formal control of predefined multilat-
eral governmental mechanisms."II
The role of secretariats has long been overlooked because secretariats are not perceived
as a significant feature of the institutional setup of treaties. The main actors are the nation
states-and the secretariats are merely at their service. Recently, however, there has been
some research on secretariats in the field of international relations. Secretariats are capa-
ble of influencing treaty negotiation and implementation. In fact, treaty secretariats are
set up precisely for this purpose - to administer negotiations and to help parties in imple-
menting MEAs.12 When a treaty is created, it involves many actors such as subsidiary
bodies, nation states, and other stakeholders such as communities and non-governmental
organisations (NGOs). Secretariats provide the link between these actors and aid their
efforts to address the policy challenge in question. Therefore, they have an important role
to play.
Sandford has divided environmental history into three parts.'3 First, there are conven-
tions such as the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild
Fauna and Flora (CITES),'4 signed in the 1970s in the aftermath of the United Nations
Conference on the Human Environment held in Stockholm in 1972. Second, there are
conventions such as the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer (Vi-
enna Convention)15 and it's Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone
Layer (Montreal Protocol)16 signed in the 1980s that came into being due to the United
Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). Finally, there are conventions such as the
Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD),' 7 the United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change (UNFCCC),18 and the United Nations Convention to Combat
Desertification in Those Countries Experiencing Serious Drought and/or Desertification,
Particularly in Africa (UNCCD),19 signed in 1992 in the aftermath of the United Nations
Conference on Environment and Development held in Rio de Janeiro. This article exam-
9. Per-Olof Busch, The Secretariat of the Climate Convention: Make a Living in a Straitacket 1 (Global
Governance Working Paper No. 22, 2006), available at http://www.glogov.org/images/doc/wp22.pdf
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ments, Tokyo, Japan, July, 14-16 (1999).
11. STFTwr.-N BAUER, The United Nations and the Fight against Desertification: What Role for the UNCCD
Secretariat?, in GOVERNING GLOBAL DESFRI7lFICATiON. LINKING ENVIRONMENTrAL DEGRADATION, Pov-
ERTY, AND PARTICIPATION 73 (2006).
12. Steffen Bauer, Does Bureaucracy Really Matter? The Authority of Intergovernmental Treaty Secretariats 21
(Paper presented at the 45th Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, Montreal, Can.,
Mar. 17-20, 2004), available at http://www.ppl.nlebooks/files/C08-0052-Bauer-Bureaucracy.pdf.
13. SANDFORD, supra note 8, at 18.
14. CITES, Mar. 3, 1973, 993 U.N.T.S. 244.
15. Vienna Convention, Mar. 22, 1985, 1513 U.N.T.S. 324.
16. MONTREAL PROTOCOL, Sept. 16, 1987, 1522 U.N.T.S. 29.
17. CBD, June 5, 1992, 1760 U.N.T.S. 143.
18. UNFCCC, May 9, 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 165.
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ines the secretariats of these five MEAs which were chosen because of their near-universal
membership.
II. Features of Environmental Secretariats
* Secretariats are central organs in an international organisation and are the functional
arm of the Conference of the Parties (COP) (or Meeting of the Parties (MOP) in the
case of Protocols) and of the MEA. Their single most important characteristic is
their international character because the secretariat staff does not owe allegiance to
national governments; it does not receive instructions from any particular govern-
ment but instead owes allegiance to the treaty, which leads to impartiality.20 Despite
this independence, a secretariat's freedom to act is largely dependent on the will of
the parties, frequently nation states. 2 1 Secretariats actually have two masters - the
treaty and the parties. There may, at times, be a conflict between the duty to obey
the parties and the duty to uphold the objectives of the treaty. Because the parties
may not always follow the treaty, the secretariats' task is even more difficult. For
instance, the UNFCCC Secretariat has been accused of bias by certain Parties be-
cause it supported the Kyoto Protocol, which is a legal instrument of the Climate
Change regime.22
* Secretariats function under a veil of legitimacy. This means that they do their work
and make proposals under the responsibility of the presiding officers/chairpersons
who have been elected by the parties. Because secretariats possess expert knowledge
of the regimes they serve and chairpersons have political authority to make use of that
knowledge, the actors have a complementary relationship: the secretariats being sub-
servient to the chairpersons. 23 Thus, secretariats' activities are carried out under a
veil of legitimacy and approved by the presiding officers. Though the presiding of-
ficers have the final say on the proposals to put forward, this veil is indispensable for
the functioning of secretariats, as they cannot openly assume the role of a leader.24
* They are modelled on the secretariats of the UN system. Their administrative
processes such as recruitment of personnel are also close to those of the UN.25 For
example, they try to maintain geographical balance while recruiting personnel.
* They are smaller than other secretariats; for example, the World Trade Organization
(WTO) and United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)
Secretariats have about 640 and 400 employees respectively, whereas the Ozone and
CBD Secretariats have about 17 and 117 employees respectively. 26
20. Grant & Barker, supra note 6, at 455.
21. Steffen Bauer, Per-Olof Busch & Bernd Siebenhiiner, Administering International Governance: What
Role for Treaty Secretariats? 2 (Global Governance Working Paper No 29, 2007), available at http://www.glo
gov.org/images/doc/WP29.pdf.
22. JOANNA DEPLEDGE, THE ORGANI7ATION OF GLOBAL NEGOTIATIONS: CONSTRUCTING FI CLI-
MATE CHANGE REGIME 65-66 (2005).
23. Joanna Depledge, A Special Relationship: Chairpersons and the Secretariat in the Climate Change Negotia-
tions, 7 GLOBAL ENvrL. POL. 45, 57 (2007).
24. DEPLEDGF, supra note 22, at 66-67.
25. SANoFORD, supra note 8, at 17, 19.
26. WTO, Annual Report 2011, http://www.wto.org/english/rese/booksp e/anrep-e/anrepli lchap7_e.
pdf; UNCTAD, The UNCTAD Secretariat, http://www.unctad.orgflemplates/Page.aspintItemlD=1931&
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* They may be activist or passive, the former being in a position to affect treaty out-
comes.27 In reality, no secretariat is passive; they only prefer to remain in the back-
ground instead of in the limelight. Thus even passive secretariats can be very active
behind the scenes. 28
* Secretariats are stable elements in a changing international system, providing an ele-
ment of permanence. This is a very important feature because national governments
come and go, but MEAs have long-term goals and so continuity in secretariats is
important. They are the only active actors between sessions of the COP and subsidi-
ary bodies. The continuity of their staff builds institutional expertise and memory.
In fact, this is the reason why parties establish secretariats. 29
* Secretariats may be created by the MEA such as in the case of CITES (article XII(1))
or by the COP. In the latter case, the MEA may establish an interim secretariat and
the COP may be required to establish the permanent secretariat. Examples are the
Vienna Convention (article 7(2)), the CBD (article 24(2)), the UNCCD (article
23(3)), and the UNFCCC (article 8(3)). Permanent secretariats are more active than
interim ones because the institutional status of the former is assured. 30
* MEAs may also make use of secretariats of existing organisations; for example, the
CBD and Ozone Secretariats are hosted by the UNEP.31 Since having their own
secretariat requires more resources, the use of established secretariats may reduce
these expenses. Also, UNEP provides an established administrative structure.
Though the Ozone Secretariat is housed within the UNEP headquarters, it is not a
necessary condition that secretariats be located physically within the premises of the
host organisation. In the case of the UNFCCC, the interim Secretariat from which
the permanent Secretariat was derived was provided by the UN Secretariat following
UN rules and using UN resources. Given these advantages, the COP, while consid-
ering the permanent Secretariat, agreed on a formal institutional linkage with the
UN. This linkage extends to administrative regulations on personnel and financial
matters such as staff entitlements and financing of Convention conferences by the
UN. Also, the Secretariat is encouraged to cooperate with other relevant agencies at
the national and international level. 32 Since the UJNFCCC and UNCCD Secretari-
ats serve autonomous UN Conventions, their Executive Secretaries are ex officio As-
sistant Secretary-Generals to the UN, whereas the Executive Secretaries of the CBD
and Ozone Secretariats report to the UN through the Executive Director of the
UNEP. According to Churchill and Ulfstein, it is possible that there may be a con-
flict between the host organisation such as UNEP and the COP of a MEA such as the
Vienna Convention in regard to the work of the MEA's secretariat. But this is largely
theoretical, as the host organisation cannot interfere in the functioning of the MEA.
lang=1; UNEP Ozone Secretariat, About the Secretariat, http://ozone.uneporg/new-site/en/aboutthe-secre-
tariat.php; CBD, The CBD Secretariat, Staff List, http://www.cbd.int/secretaria/staff.
27. RosEMARY SANDFORD, Secretariats and International Environmental Negotiations: Two New Models, in
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL TREATY MAKING 27 (1992).
28. Depledge, supra note 23, at 54.
29. SANDFORD, supra note 8, at 17, 19.
30. Id. at 19.
31. Vienna Convention, Mar. 22, 1985, 1513 U.N.T.S. 324, art. 7(2).
32. Administrative and Financial Matters Institutional Linkage of the Convention Secretariat to the United Na-
tions, 11 5, 7-8, 10, UN Doc. FCCC/SBI/1999/7 (Apr. 16, 1999).
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The UNEP emphasises its importance in relation to the Ozone Secretariat, but the
latter is a distinct intergovernmental secretariat,33 and the UNEP can only intervene
in its administrative matters. In fact, the COP confers certain powers on the UNEP
because it hosts the MEA secretariats, but the UNEP follows the UN rules in ad-
ministering the secretariats. 34 In the case of the UNFCCC, this distinction is quite
clear (i.e., the Secretariat reports to the COP for MEA work and to the UN for staff
matters). 35 Moreover, in the case of the CITES Secretariat administered by UNEP,
its conflicts with the UNEP relate to staff and budget matters. 36
m. Legal Personality of Environmental Secretariats
Before examining the legal status of secretariats, it is worthwhile to define the compo-
nents of legal status. The legal status of an entity may be characterised by the following
attributes: (1) it should have rights and privileges of a binding nature; (2) no party should
be able to alter the position of the entity in any manner or take any decision contrary to
the rights or interests of the entity without its consent; and (3) it should have the capacity
to enter into agreements or contracts with other parties.
The question of international legal personality of secretariats will benefit from a discus-
sion of two Advisory Opinions of the International Court of Justice (ICJ). In the Advisory
Opinion of April 11, 1949, on Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the
United Nations,37 the ICJ stated that in case an agent of the UN suffered injury while
performing his duties, the UN as an organisation had the capacity to bring an interna-
tional claim against the government of the state responsible for the injury in order to
obtain reparation for damages caused to the UN and to the victim. This would apply in
the case of a member and non-member state that has breached its obligations towards the
UN because the members of the UN created an entity whose international legal personal-
ity is objective and therefore recognised by non-members as well.38 According to the ICJ,
the capacity to bring a claim vests with states and if organisations can bring claims, it
would mean they have international personality. The ICJ did not say that a forum where
a claim can be brought is required to confer international legal personality on the organi-
sation. The Court further stated that because the UN Charter conferred rights and obli-
gations on the UN, the latter had legal personality.
Additionally, according to the ICJ in its Advisory Opinion of December 20, 1980 on the
question of the Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 between the World
33. Bauer, supra note 12, at 17.
34. UNEP, The Relationship between the Executive Director of UNEP and the Conventions Regarding the Admin-
istration of Their Secretariats, Fourth Meeting on Coordination of Secretarits of Environmental Conventions,
UN Doc. UNEP/DEP/Coord.4/3/COR.1 1-7 at 2, 3 (Jan. 4, 1996), in BilARAT H. DESAI, INSTITUTIONAL.
IZING INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAw 210 (2004).
35. See Churchill & Ulfstein, supra note 4, at 628, 635.
36. See Rosemary Sandford, Secretariats as Catalysts: A Comparative Study of the Influence of Global
Environmental Treaty Secretariats on Treaty Implementation (June 1998) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology) at 234-35, http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/28197.
37. See Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion: I.C.
Reports 1949, p. 174.
38. See id. at 185, 187.
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Health Organization (WHO) and Egypt,39 a contractual legal regime was created between
Egypt and the WHO when they entered into an agreement on March 25, 1951. This
agreement had a legally binding character and the WHO was able to ask for an Advisory
Opinion concerning this agreement. Could the fact that the WHO was able to enter into
an agreement with legally binding character mean that the WHO has international legal
personality? Even if the secretariat of a MEA has rights that can be enforced against
parties there may be no forum where these can be enforced. That does not mean, how-
ever, that the secretariat does not possess legal personality. Applying the Reparations
Advisory Opinion, one could say an environmental secretariat can bring a claim against a
state, but in which forum? MEAs do not contain dispute redressal forums4o such as in the
WTO. Even if they did, it is not known if a secretariat could bring a claim against the
parties in such a forum given that these forums are generally established to resolve dis-
putes between parties to the organisation, as is the case of the VTO. In case the secreta-
riat wanted to bring a claim against a non-party in a case similar to the Reparations
Opinion, where would it do so? Even if one does not apply the two Advisory Opinions in
the case of secretariats because they relate to organisations and not secretariats, the fact
remains that a secretariat has rights. The question is whether these rights are sufficient to
confer international legal personality on the secretariat. Applying the Reparations Opin-
ion, the fact that the MEA confers rights and obligations on the secretariat may indicate
that it has international legal personality.
Another aspect of the legal personality issue is that environmental secretariats are fre-
quently linked to the UN. Would they, as a consequence, have legal personality because
the UN has it? For example, the Climate Change Convention Secretariat is institutionally
linked to the UN while not being fully integrated in the work programme and manage-
ment structure of any particular department or programme.41 The meaning of "institu-
tionally" is not relevant because the legal regime enjoyed by the UN cannot be
automatically extended to the UNFCCC Secretariat. 42 For the Secretariat to have legal
personality, the COP would have to confer it by means of a decision.43 But the COP still
has to consider whether the Secretariat should be given international legal personality.44
On the other hand, the host organisation, the UN in this case, may commit a breach of its
obligations if it does not provide resources to the Secretariat for its functions.4s This
would mean that the Secretariat has international legal personality. Regarding other
MEAs, the UNEP administers the CITES Secretariat and hosts the Ozone and CBD
Secretariats (CITES, the Vienna Convention, and the Montreal Protocol were "negoti-
39. See Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 between the WHO and Egypt, Advisory Opin-
ion, I.C.J. Reports 1980, p. 73.
40. The UNFCCC, the Vienna Convention, and the CBD all state that disputes can be referred to the ICJ,
which means that the Convention itself does not have a dispute redressal forum. See UNFCCC, May 9, 1992,
1771 U.N.T.S. 165, art. 14(2)(a); Vienna Convention, Mar. 22, 1985, 1513 U.N.T.S. 324, art. Il(3)(b); CBD,
June 5, 1992, 1760 U.N.T.S. 143, art. 27(3)(b).
41. Institutional Linkage of the Convention Secretariat to the United Nations, Climate Change COP De-
cision 14/CP.1, UN Doc. FCCC/CP/1995/7/Add.1, at 42, 2.
42. Institutional and Budgetary Matters: Arrangements for Relocation of the Convention Secretariat to
Bonn, UN Doc. FCCC/SBI/1996/7, T 7.
43. See id. 11(5).
44. Agreement Concerning the Headquarters of the Convention Secretariat, Climate Change COP Deci-
sion 15/CP.2, UN Doc. FCCC/CP/1996/15/Add.1, at 63, T 2.
45. See Churchill & Ulfstein, supra note 4, at 635.
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ated under the auspices of UNEP").46 The same question regarding legal personality
would arise in the case of these secretariats as well.
It is also possible to look at the Headquarters agreement to locate the secretariat in a
particular country. For example, the Headquarters agreement between the UNFCCC
Secretariat, the UN, and the Republic of Germany to locate the Secretariat in Germany
states that the Secretariat shall have legal capacity in Germany. 4 7 The COP has approved
this agreement.4 8 The Secretariat's authority to enter into such an agreement derives
from the request of the Subsidiary Body for Implementation49 and is not conclusive of the
Secretariat's international legal personality. Article 6(3) of the Headquarters agreement
requires twelve months' notice in order for the agreement to be terminated.50 Does this
mean that if this provision is not honoured, the injured party is entitled to bring a claim?
If the answer is in the affirmative, the Secretariat would have international legal personal-
ity. But again the question arises, in which forum would the claim be settled? Moreover,
article 6(4) of the Headquarters agreement states that disputes are to be settled in accor-
dance with article 26(2) of the United Nations Volunteers Programme Headquarters
Agreement which provides that disputes are to be resolved on the basis of international
law.5 1 Article 6(6) of the Headquarters agreement stipulates that the agreement enters
into force after notification from PartieS. 52 Would this suffice to provide international
legal personality to the Secretariat which is party to the Headquarters agreement? How-
ever, the UN Office of Legal Affairs has stated that the Secretariat is not de jure a UN
subsidiary organ.53 In the case of the CBD, the Headquarters agreement is between Ca-
nada and the UNEP; the Secretariat is not a party.5 4 If the Secretariat is not even in-
volved, the question of its international legal personality likely does not arise.
Article 24(l)(d) of the CBD, article 8(2)(f) of the UNFCCC, article 23(2)(e) of the
UNCCD, and article 7(l)(e) of the Vienna Convention state that Secretariats shall ensure
necessary coordination with other international bodies and enter into such administrative
and contractual arrangements as may be required for the effective discharge of their func-
tions.55 These articles are not limited to domestic arrangements. 5 6 Can this be construed
as authorising these Secretariats to enter into binding international agreements? Accord-
46. Id. at 630.
47. Administrative and Financial Matters Establisbment of the Permanent Secretariat and Arrangements for its
Functioning, UN Doc. FCCC/CP/1996/MISC.1, art. 4(1).
48. Agreement Concerning the Headquarters of the Convention Secretariat, Climate Change COP Deci-
sion 15/CP.2, UN Doc. FCCC/CP/1996/15/Add.1, at 63, 9 1.
49. Report of the Subsidiary Body for Implementation on the Work of its Second Session, held at Geneva
from 27 February to 8 March 1996, UN Doc. FCCC/SBI/1996/9, I 66(c).
50. Administrative and Financial Matters Establishment of the Permanent Secretariat and Arrangements for its
Functioning, UN Doc. FCCC/CP/1996/MISC.1, art. 6(3).
51. Id. at art. 6(4).
52. Id. at art. 6(6).
53. Institutional and Budgetary Matters: Arrangements for Relocation of the Convention Secretariat to Bonn, UN
Doc. FCCC/SBI/1996/7supra note, at 11(2).
54. Location of the Secretariat, CBD COP Decision 11/19, T 5, available at http://www.cbd.int/decision/cop/?
id=7092.
55. See CBD,June 5, 1992, 1760 U.N.T.S. 143, art. 24(1)(d); UNTFCCC, May 9,1992,1771 U.N.T.S. 165,
art. 8(2)(f; UNCCD, June 17, 1994, 1954 U.N.T.S. 108, art. 23(2)(e); Vienna Convention, Mar. 22, 1985,
1513 U.N.T.S. 324, art. 7(1)(e).
56. Churchill & Ulfstein, supra note 4, at 649.
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ing to the Handbook of the Convention on Biological Diversity Including its Cartagena
Protocol on Biosafety, a liaison group of the Secretariats of the three Rio conventions
(CBD, UNFCCC and UNCCD) has been established to promote complementarities
amongst the Secretariats without compromising their independent legal status.57 Does
this legal status refer only to the authority required to form such a group? In other words,
is this an example of the aforementioned secretarial function? Or can it be interpreted to
mean a status beyond that? Given that one secretariat can enter into an agreement with
another one, it may seem plausible to conclude that secretariats have legal personality on
the international plane. But in the case of the UNFCCC Secretariat, the COP still has to
consider the question of legal personality.
The CITES Secretariat has entered into memoranda of understanding with various sec-
retariats, government departments, universities, and others.58 The CBD Secretariat has
also entered into memoranda of cooperation with various other secretariats. 59 One such
memorandum with the Secretariat of the Convention.on Wetlands of International Im-
portance Especially as Waterfowl Habitat (Ramsar Secretariat) is termed an "agreement"
and requires a year's notice for termination. 60 The legal personality of the Secretariats
would depend on whether they can bring a claim in case the provision is not complied
with. In other words did the parties create a binding agreement? The use of exhortatory
language in the memoranda indicates that they are not intended to be binding.61 This can
be distinguished from the case of the WHO Advisory Opinion wherein the agreement
between Egypt and WHO had a legally binding character.
IV. Functions of Environmental Secretariats
* All the secretariats examined here perform certain common functions. These are
generally of an administrative nature because the work of the secretariat is to provide
services to the treaty regime. Such functions may be (1) arranging and servicing the
sessions of COP, MOP, and subsidiary bodies; (2) preparing and transmitting reports
based on information received; (3) assisting developing country parties in compiling
and transmitting requisite information; (4) preparing activity reports for the COP; (5)
coordination with secretariats of other international bodies; (6) entering into arrange-
ments with external entities for its proper functioning; and (7) performing residual
functions as required by the Convention/Protocol or COP/MOP. Since the advent
of the internet, secretariats also maintain the websites of MEAs.
Basically, secretariats are responsible for efficient conduct of the work of the treaty,
their main task being to ensure the smooth functioning of meetings and conferences or-
ganised under the aegis of the MEA.62 They may also prepare the provisional agenda,
57. SECRETARIAT OF THE CONVENT-ION ON BIOLOGIcAL DIVERSITY, HANDBOOK OF THE CONVENTION
ON BIOLOCICAL DIVERSITY INCLUDING ITS CARTAGENA PROTOCOL ON BIOsAFrY, at xxxiii (3rd ed. 2005).
58. See CITES, Cooperation and Partnerships, http://www.cites.org/eng/disc/coop.php (last visited Nov. 18,
2011).
59. See Churchill & Ulfstein, supra note 4, at 654.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. See Volker R6ben, Institutional Developments under Modern International Environmental Agreements, 4
MAx PLANCK YEARBOOK OF UNITED NATIONS LAW 363, 423-24 (2000), available at http://www.mpil.de/
shared/data/pdf/pdfmpunyb/roeben_4.pdf.
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undertake studies, give advice on legal, technical, and procedural matters, inform the par-
ties of the meetings, and facilitate the process as a whole.63 Rule 9 of the UNFCCC Rules
of Procedure states that the Secretariat shall draft the provisional agenda of the COP
sessions in agreement with the President.64 The Climate Change and CBD Secretariats
also organise technical workshops to advance discussions in subsidiary bodies and then
summarise the results. 65 Secretariats also present introductory notes on submissions of
working groups or parties.66 Given that secretariats prepare the provisional agenda and
do the preparatory work, they are "able to pre-structure the political process at the meet-
ings" 67 and thus exercise some influence in the political decision-making process. How-
ever, secretariats do not generally submit proposals in the form of recommendations to
the parties unless mandated by the latter to do so. 6 8
Even though it is not very frequent, secretariats may provide an opinion on the inter-
pretation and application of the MEA. For instance, the CITES Secretariat clearly
termed a COP decision as incompatible with the treaty because it did not follow the speci-
fied procedure for the transfer of a species from one Appendix to another.69
The nature of functions performed by secretariats also depends on the aims of the
MEA. Some secretariats perform certain specific tasks related to the aforementioned
functions. The Ozone Secretariat notifies Parties of requests for technical assistance and
informs non-Party observers as well, leading to more transparency. 70 It also encourages
non-Parties to attend sessions of MOP as observers.7 ' The UNCCD Secretariat assists
developing members, particularly in Africa, in compiling and communicating requisite
information to the COP, thus helping them to meet the requirements of the Conven-
tion. 72 The CBD Secretariat organises all meetings under the Convention, prepares doc-
uments, facilitates the flow of information, represents the Convention externally, and
promotes public awareness activities in pursuance of article 13 of the Convention.73 It
also assists the Parties to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety (Cartagena Protocol), 74 and
if the costs of the Secretariat services for this Protocol are distinct, the costs are met by the
Parties to the Protocol (article 31(3) of the Cartagena Protocol).75 This is a unique provi-
sion and is not provided for in the Kyoto and Montreal Protocols. The CITES Secreta-
riat publishes and distributes to the parties current editions of Appendices containing lists
of species. 76 The secretariats also play a role in the compliance/implementation proce-
dure of the treaties.
63. See id. at 424, n.197.




68. See id. at 424-25.
69. See id. at 431, n. 212.
70. See MONTREAL PROTOCOL, Sept. 16, 1987, 1522 U.N.T.S. 29, art. 12(d), (f).
71. See id. at art. 12(e)-(f).
72. See UNCCD, June 17, 1994, 1954 U.N.T.S. 108, art. 23(2)(c).
73. See CBD, THE CBD SECRETARIAT, ROLE, http://www.cbd.int/secretariat/role.shtml (last visited July
.10, 2011).
74. CARTAGENA PROTOCOL ON BIoSAFETY TO THE CONvENTION ON BIOLOGiCAL DIVERSITY, JAN. 29,
2000, 2226 U.N.T.S. 257.
75. See id. at art. 31(3).
76. See CITES, Mar. 3, 1973, 993 U.N.T.S. 244, art. XII(2)(f).
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V. Role of Secretariats in Compliance/Implementation of the Treaty
The idea of negotiating a MEA is to attain the objective of protecting certain environ-
mental resources. The parties to the MEA are required to comply with the treaty. The
secretariats directly administer the MEA by administering the compliance and implemen-
tation mechanisms. Indirectly, secretariats help in compliance, mainly by assisting devel-
oping parties if they so request, in compiling and communicating information required
under the conventions (article 8(2)(c) of the UNFCCC and article 23(2)(c) of the
UNCCD) and by disseminating information relating to technologies.77 Thus, this secre-
tarial function effectively has two aspects to it: compliance monitoring and
implementation.
A. ROLE OF SECRETARIATS IN MONITORING OF COMPLIANCE
Generally, all the secretariats in the sample receive factual information on compliance
from the parties and forward it to the organ that assesses and evaluates this information.
Secretariats play a bigger role in MEAs whose implementing mechanism consists of lists
of species, substances or areas controlled because parties are required to provide informa-
tion regarding regulatory action taken in respect of such lists to the secretariat to be up-
dated or maintained by the latter.78 For example, in the case of the Montreal Protocol and
the CITES, secretariats can trigger the non-compliance procedure.79
According to article 12(1), (2), (3) of the UNFCCC, Parties are required to communi-
cate to the Secretariat steps taken and policies and measures adopted or envisaged for
implementation of the Convention and other relevant information such as the effects of
the measures.80 The Secretariat transmits such information to the COP and subsidiary
bodies (article 12(6)).51 In the case of the Kyoto Protocol, the UNFCCC Secretariat
transmits the reports prepared by the Expert Review Teams to all the Parties to the Con-
vention. 82 It also lists for further consideration by the MOP any questions of implementa-
tion mentioned in these reports. These reports contain not only an assessment of the
implementation of the commitments of Parties but also potential problems and factors
influencing compliance (article 8(3)).83 What is important is that the Secretariat does not
by itself initiate the procedure, but only transmits the reports. Thus it facilitates flow of
information that supports the compliance regime of the Kyoto Protocol and helps in mon-
itoring implementation of the Convention.
Under article 9(1) of the UNCCD, the Secretariat receives notifications of national
action plans for implementation by the Parties.84 Article 26(1) requires the Parties to
provide to the Secretariat reports on measures taken for the implementation of the Con-
vention. The Parties also provide information on the implementation of strategies and
77. See UNFCCC, May 9, 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 165, art. 8(2)(c); UNCCD,June 17, 1994, 1954 U.N.T.S.
108, art. 23(2)(c).
78. Rdben, sutpra note 62, at 427.
79. See id. at 430-31.
80. UNFCCC, May 9, 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 165, art. 12(1)-(3).
81. See id. at art. 12(6).
82. See Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC, Dec. 11, 1997, 2303 U.N.T.S. 214, art. 8(3).
83. Id.
84. UNCCD, June 17, 1994, 1954 U.N.T.S. 108, art. 9(1).
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programmes and may make a submission on measures taken at subregional/regional levels
as part of action programmes (article 26(2), (3), (4)).8s The Secretariat is required to com-
municate such information to the COP and subsidiary bodies (article 26(6)).86 Appended
to the Convention are four regional implementation annexes by region of the world viz.
Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, and Northern Mediterranean.87 In the
case of the first three regions, the Secretariat may facilitate consultative processes or coor-
dination meetings for implementation if so desired by the Parties by way of providing
advice on the organisation of effective consultative/coordination arrangements, providing
information to bilateral and multilateral agencies concerning consultative/coordination
meetings or processes to encourage their active involvement, and providing other relevant
information to establish or improve consultative/coordination arrangements/processes. 88
This indicates that the functions of the Secretariat of the UNCCD have a strong develop-
ing country focus. But otherwise, the powers of the Secretariat in regard to implementa-
tion do not amount to much and can be said to be on par with those of the UNFCCC
Secretariat. Despite this, the Secretariat has played an important role in interpreting the
meaning of "implementation" and acting accordingly as we will see further on in this
article.
According to the CBD Secretariat, it plays an important role in assisting the implemen-
tation of the Convention.89 It compiles national reports on compliance by domestic au-
thorities, synthesises these reports and information on implementation, and then forwards
the resulting synthesis to the COP.90 So the Secretariat compiles the report on compli-
ance, unlike the UNFCCC Secretariat which transmits to the Parties reports prepared by
the Expert Review Teams and the UNCCD Secretariat which transmits to the COP infor-
mation obtained from the Parties.9'
According to article 5 of the Vienna Convention, the Secretariat receives information
from the Parties on measures adopted to implement the objectives of the Convention and
Protocols and transmits it to the COP.92 Here, the Ozone Secretariat acts in a manner
similar to the UNCCD Secretariat.
The Montreal Protocol has a separate non-compliance procedure giving enhanced
powers to the Secretariat.93 The Ozone Secretariat coordinates the flow of information
between the Parties and the Implementation Committee.94 Any Party can make a submis-
sion regarding its reservations as to the implementation of the Montreal Protocol by an-
other Party and the Secretariat will transmit this submission to the Party concerned who
85. Id. at art. 26(2)-(4).
86. Id. at art. 26(6).
87. See id. at Annexes I-IV.
88. See id. at Annex I, art. 18(4); Annex II, art. 8(3); Annex Ell, art. 7(2).
89. See CBD, TiE CBD SECRETARIAT, ROLE, http://www.cbd.int/secretariat/role.shtnl (last visited July
10, 2011).
90. See id.
91. See Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC, Dec. 11, 1997, 2303 U.N.T.S. 214, art. 8(3);UNCCD, June 17,
1994, 1954 U.N.T.S. 108, art. 26(6).
92. See Vienna Convention, Mar. 22, 1985, 1513 U.N.T.S. 324, art. 5.
93. See Montreal Protocol, Report of the Fourth Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that
Deplete the Ozone Layer, Nov. 25, 1992, U.N. Doc. UNEP/OzL.Pro.4/15, Annex IV.
94. See id. at Annex IV, '1 2.
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has to file a reply and substantiating information to the Secretariat and the Parties.95 The
Secretariat sends these documents together with the submission to the Implementation
Committee96 If the Secretariat becomes aware of possible non-compliance by a Party
who does or does not provide information on request, the Secretariat shall inform the
MOP and the Implementation Committee.97 The Secretariat transmits to the MOP in-
formation received from Parties relating to results of non-compliance proceedings under
article 11 of the Vienna Convention.98 The Secretariat also transmits to the Implementa-
tion Committee any explanation provided by any Party as to the reasons for non-compli-
ance.99 The Implementation Committee can also request information from the
Secretariat100 With respect to the Montreal Protocol, the Secretariat also receives statis-
tical data from Parties regarding the production, import, and export of controlled sub-
stances (article 7 of the Montreal Protocol).oi The Parties are also required to report to
the Secretariat every two years on the research and exchange of information they have
engaged in to promote awareness regarding the substances that deplete the Ozone layer
(article 9 of the Montreal Protocol).10 2 It then prepares and distributes to the Parties
reports based on this technical information (article 12(c) of the Montreal Protocol), thus
providing the informational basis for legislative decision-making by the latter. 0 3 Given
that the Secretariat receives this information from the Parties, it is in a position to know
about possible non-compliance and can initiate the procedure. This is unlike the
UNFCCC Secretariat in the case of the Kyoto Protocol and the UNCCD and CBD
Secretariats that do not inform the Implementation Committee of non-compliance and so
do not initiate the procedure.
Under article VIII(4)(c) of the CITES, if a living specimen is confiscated, the Manage-
ment Authority may consult the Secretariat to decide the future course of action. 04 This
may include returning the specimen to the state or putting it in a rescue centre or other
appropriate place. 0 s Article VIII(7) requires Parties to transmit to the Secretariat reports
on implementation of the Convention containing details of trade in designated species as
well as legislative, administrative, and regulatory measures taken to enforce the Conven-
tion. 06 The Secretariat can ask the Parties to supply further information required for the
implementation of the Convention (article XII(2)(d)) and files reports to the Parties on the
implementation of the Convention (article XII(2)(g)). 07 It also undertakes technical stud-
ies on issues concerning implementation of the Convention (article XII(2)(c)) and is the
only secretariat that makes recommendations regarding implementation (article
XII(2)(h)).i0 The CITES Secretariat can be said to act like the Ozone Secretariat, be-
95. See id. at Annex IV, 1 1, 2.
96. See id. 2.
97. See id. at Annex IV, 3.
98. See id. at Annex IV, 12.
99. See id. at Annex IV, 4.
100. See id. at Annex IV, ' 7(c).
101. See MONTREAL PROTOCOL, Sept. 16, 1987, 1522 U.N.T.S. 29, art 7.
102. See id. at art. 9.
103. See id. at art. 12(c).
104. See CITES, Mar. 3, 1973, 993 U.N.T.S. 244, art. VIII(4)(c).
105. See id. at art. VIII(4)(b).
106. See id. at art. VIII(7).
107. See id. at art. XII(2)(d), (g).
108. See id. at art. XII(2)(c), (h).
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cause it has the authority to take action on its own and inform the Management Authority
of a Party in case a species is adversely affected by trade or the Convention is not being
implemented (article XIlI(1)).109 In such a case, the Party concerned has to reply to the
Secretariat and propose remedial action (article XIII(2)).no So the role of the CITES
Secretariat is more advanced than that of the UNFCCC, UNCCD, and CBD Secretariats
because it goes beyond merely transmitting information. Like the Ozone Secretariat, the
CITES Secretariat can ask the Parties for more information and even go further as it can
make recommendations.
The CITES COP has recognised the important role played by the Secretariat in the
enforcement process. In 2000, the CITES COP urged the Parties and external actors to
provide additional funds to the Secretariat to reinforce the enforcement mechanism.''
These funds were to be used to appoint additional officers in the Secretariat to work on
enforcement-related issues, to assist in the drafting and implementation of regional en-
forcement agreements, and to provide training and technical assistance to the Parties.
The Secretariat had also been allowed to take measures with the International Criminal
Police Organization (ICPO-Interpol) and the World Customs Organization to facilitate
the exchange of information.112 The COP also directed the Secretariat to work closely
not only with the aforementioned actors but also with the Convention's institutions, na-
tional enforcement agencies, and existing intergovernmental bodies such as the UN Office
on Drugs and Crime and submit a report on enforcement matters at each meeting of the
COP.13
Moreover, its many recommendations gave the Secretariat a larger role in the enforce-
ment procedure. These recommendations included asking the Parties to provide further
information to the Secretariat within a time limit, authorising the Secretariat to report
implementation problems to the Standing Committee in case they remain unsolved even
after provision of technical assistance to the Party concerned, and the establishment of
enforcement task forces by the Secretariat." 4
The process of receiving reports and commencement of the non-compliance procedure
by the secretariats is very significant because parties are not willing to initiate such proce-
dures against each other. Not many secretariats have been entrusted with the function of
triggering the non-compliance procedure with most being relegated to a fact-gathering
role.
B. SECRETARIAL ASSISTANCE IN IMPLEMENTATION
Secretariats assist parties in implementing the MEA, thus complying with international
obligations. Because secretariats receive national reports, they are in a position to know
implementation difficulties faced by members and, consequently, to know their needs.
Secretariats use their contacts and expertise to provide assistance such as legal and policy
109. See id. at art. XIII(1).
110. See id. at art. XIII(2).
111. See CITES COP, 11th Sess. (Apr. 10-20, 2000), Resolution Conf. 11.3 (Rev. CoP15) Compliance and
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advice as well as access to external funds. 5 This kind of assistance is useful for the coun-
try and also for the secretariat because it enhances its credibility and influence.
The UNFCCC Secretariat is not mandated to do much in the field of implementation.
It does not disburse funds or implement projects. It does not favour adoption of any
particular policies nor can it take decisions or impose sanctions on Parties to make them
comply. The Secretariat only collects and processes information and coordinates reviews
of data communicated by Parties.'1 6 However, the Secretariat tries to ensure that devel-
oped countries are mindful of the concerns of the Association of Small Island States when
they take decisions."t7 In fact, this reticent attitude may be the result of the Secretariat's
narrow mandate and the fact that Parties guard their sovereignty zealously. Even if the
Secretariat makes an objective suggestion in favour of implementation of the treaty, it
could be misinterpreted by the Parties.
The UNCCD Secretariat has, by way of institutionalisation of the Convention, helped
in its implementation.1 8 It does not have the resources to fund projects but indirectly
helps capacity development within the jurisdiction of members." 9 It provides documen-
tation on the Convention in UN languages and prepares informational kits for elementary
schools.120 It also helps in establishing National Action Programmes (NAPs) in affected
countries. 121 It prepares the national focal points to deal with international partners and
helps international donors identify people who need training to implement the Conven-
tion locally.122 The Secretariat staff also assists the national focal points of developing
members by advising them on how to fulfil the requirements of the COP.123 The staff
sometimes holds workshops and sensitises the national focal points of the funding oppor-
tunities available but such workshops are rather rare due to a shortage of resources.1 24
The CBD Secretariat provides skills-oriented capacity building.125 It does this by or-
ganising courses, compiling and publishing guidelines and administrative practices, and
responding to requests on how to build capacity for implementation of the Convention.126
Practitioners in member states find these activities useful.127 These efforts are commend-
able because capacity building is not in the mandate of the Secretariat nor does it have the
resources to fund projects.128 However, the Secretariat has not been very successful in
fulfilling the monitoring obligation because states do not want to be controlled by it. For
instance, the Secretariat developed a scheme to include quantifiable measures in national
reports filed by states to the Secretariat, but the scheme was not adopted by the Parties.129
115. See Sandford, supra note 36, at 122.
116. See Busch, supra note 9, at 7-8, 10.
117. See Sandford, supra note 36, at 123.
118. Bauer, Busch, & Siebenhilner, supra note 21, at 18.
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In fact, the Parties frequently do not even provide the reports to the Secretariat, and it has
to ask for them.130
The Ozone Secretariat is not mandated to build technical and financial capacity. 31 In-
stead, it has created a very efficient communication network with the National Ozone
Units and advises national bureaucrats on request.132 It also holds workshops in develop-
ing countries to prepare the staff of the National Ozone Units for sessions of MOP who
then prepare their delegates.133 This helps them link their work at the local level with the
ozone discourse at the international level.134 This is useful for developing members as it
helps them in fulfilling the implementation objectives of the regime. This provision of
advice on implementation-related matters has an impact on the management of compli-
ance issues at the national level.135 Because the delegates of the National Ozone Units are
better informed, they can contribute better to international cooperation. The Secretariat
also administers the reporting requirements of members, which is a complex function be-
cause the number of members in the Convention, Protocol, and its amendments is not the
same.136
The CITES Secretariat helps developing members access international scientific and
financial resources such as the CITES Trust Fund, which helps them fulfil their reporting
and performance obligations. 37 The CITES Trust Fund is a financial mechanism of the
Convention itself.'38 It matches external donors with a needy country to develop national
legislation and strengthen implementation of the Convention.139 The Secretariat's close
links with NGOs help in capacity building activities such as training and technology trans-
fer. 140 It holds extensive regional training programmes as part of its regional and national
capacity building initiatives.141 The CITES Secretariat and World Wide Fund for Na-
ture/Trade Records Analysis of Flora and Fauna in Commerce collaborate to oversee in-
ternational trade records and bring to light illegal trafficking in prohibited species.142
This collaboration takes the form of statistical correlation of trade reports and field work
by the NGO.14
These activities show the significant role played by secretariats in implementation. Not
all secretariats have been granted the same powers, nor do all of them play equally impor-
tant roles (for example, the UNFCCC Secretariat has not been mandated to do much, and
as a result, does not do much). Nevertheless, they are indispensable as "subjects of coordi-
130. Id.
131. Steffen Bauer, The Ozone Secretariat: Administering the Vienna Convention and the Montreal Protocol on




134. Id. at 8-9.
135. Bauer, supra note 12, at 18.
136. Bauer, Busch, & Siebenhiiner, supra note 21, at 24.
137. Sandford, supra note 36, at 117.
138. Id. at 120.
139. Id. at 119.
140. Id. at 127.
141. Id. at 232.
142. Id. at 111.
143. Id. at 126.
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nation" because they transfer information between different actors of their respective re-
gimes, which finally leads to the fulfilment of the treaty objectives.
VI. Comparative Assessment of the Actual Functioning of Secretariats
Now that we have seen the important role played by secretariats in an international
treaty system, it is worthwhile to shed light on the effects of their functions. What has
been the impact of secretarial functions? This is the subject to which the article now
turns.
The effects of the functions performed by secretariats can be divided into two catego-
ries: cognitive, and normative. 144 Cognitive effects include processing and distributing
data to stakeholders.145 In fact, dissemination of information is a key function of secretari-
ats.146 This may affect the knowledge or belief systems of the actors because political
activity is dependent on the information received by the parties from the secretariat.147
Normative effects include norm-building processes that can also influence political activ-
ity aimed at international cooperation.'48 For example, secretariats play a role at the time
of treaty negotiation and its amendment by way of protocols.149 They frame the agenda
and procedures in negotiations, thus exercising a certain amount of influence on norm
setting.1so This influence can be used by the secretariat to further the institutionalisation
and implementation of the treaty.15
A. COGNITIVE EFFECTS
Although the UNFCCC Secretariat does not really generate new knowledge, it does
process factual and descriptive information used by stakeholders, thus contributing to
public discourse.152 Different stakeholders-such as policy makers, negotiators, civil soci-
ety, and the media-interpret the information provided by the Secretariat.ss The docu-
mentation provided by the Secretariat is in great demand and a large number of visitors
visit its website frequently.154 Moreover, Parties have also requested information in lan-
guages other than English. 55 But the Secretariat's compiling and disseminating activity is
dependent on the data provided by the Parties.s 6 Thus, even though the Secretariat co-
ordinates the reporting obligations of the Parties, it cannot critically evaluate the data
provided by them because the Parties may perceive it as a political assessment.157 In fact,
144. Bauer, Busch, & Siebenhiner, supra note 21, at 1.
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the job of the Secretariat is to remove all politically-inclined information from the docu-
ments it prepares.158
The UNCCD Secretariat has been more visible in its cognitive effects. It has, for ex-
ample, deliberately maintained the use of the expression "desertification" as opposed to
"land degradation," because the former has a political appeal and affects the perception of
the problem by non-experts.159 The Secretariat has also succeeded in making the deser-
tification problem appear global instead of regional.o60 This has had a significant conse-
quence because the UNCCD projects are now eligible for funding from the Global
Environment Facility (GEF).161 The Secretariat has always lobbied for developing coun-
tries and kept the issue alive at the GEF Council.162 The Secretariat staff acknowledges
its role in obtaining such funding and states that because the UNCCD does not have its
own finances, funding from the GEF is necessary to implement its objectives.1 63
The Secretariat also prepares documents on request by the Parties and makes them
available on its website. As provided by its mandate, the UNCCD Secretariat has estab-
lished good contacts with NGOs to promote regional action planS.164 This cooperation is
a continuation of the negotiation phase of the treaty in which NGOs were very closely
involved.165 The Secretariat has also been accused of controversial financial support to
select NGOs that has led to a review of its activities by the Parties.166
The CBD Secretariat, which is also the outcome of the Rio Summit like the two previ-
ous Secretariats, has been successful in its cognitive effects even though they are not very
remarkable.67 In fact, its mandate does not prescribe scientific research.168 Despite this,
it has been quite active in bringing together and diffusing scientific knowledge.169 For
this purpose, it maintains close contact with the scientific community.170 The Secretariat
mainly collects scientific information on different ecosystems and processes it for the
member states.'17 For this, it maintains a scientific and technical division.172 The Secre-
tariat prepares documents, reports, handbooks, and newsletters in addition to providing
information on its website.' 73 It also publishes the Global Biodiversity Outlook, a report
on the measures to implement the objectives of the Convention.174 Therefore, the Secre-
tariat has extensive expertise on biodiversity-related matters and functions as an informa-
158. Busch, supra note 9, at 3.
159. BAUER, supra note 11, at 78-79.
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tion hub.175 It is also involved in a review mechanism supported by governments and
NGOs.176 But the information supplied by the Secretariat is primarily used by member
states and NGOs and not generally used by the scientific and business communities.'77
The Secretariat has not been able to influence public discourse in its field.178 Its activities
do not garner much attention from the media either. 79 This is despite the fact that the
information it provides is viewed as credible by various stakeholders that make use of it.80
Nevertheless, this credibility coupled with the fact that the Secretariat is viewed as politi-
cally neutral leads to a relationship of trust between the Parties and the Secretariat.181
One reason for the limited (but successful) cognitive effects of the CBD Secretariat is
that biodiversity loss does not generate public interest.182 For example, the loss of species
of insects does not lead to natural disasters and therefore its redressal is not a priority for
the public.183 Hence, the activities of the Secretariat cannot generate enough public opin-
ion to impact the actions of the member states. It has only had a limited influence on
public awareness of biodiversity but has still helped in the identification of new environ-
mental issues in national jurisdictions.184 Consequently, the Secretariat has responded by
coming up with a communication strategy to reach a wider public.s85 Its aim is to educate
the media, students, governments, etc. of biodiversity conservation.186 Another reason for
the CBD Secretariat's limited cognitive effects is that biodiversity conservation measures
involving rights of land owners are politically sensitive and therefore the Secretariat can-
not do much.187 Additionally, the objectives of the Convention are vague and do not
include any specific quantifiable targets to be achieved by member states.'88 In such a
situation, the effects of the Secretariat may actually be considered remarkable.
The Ozone Secretariat, which, like the other two Secretariats in the sample, serves a
Protocol also, has had significant cognitive effects.' 89 This is despite the fact that it did
not develop from the UNEP Ozone Unit until after the adoption of the Montreal Proto-
col in 1987.190 It plays an important role in highlighting unsolved issues in the ozone
regime.191 Because the Montreal Protocol is considered one of the most effective envi-
ronmental treaties, governments are lackadaisical in their attitude towards it, which leads
to the exploitation of unregulated ozone depleting substances by the private sector.192 It is
precisely in this area that the Secretariat has a role to play, because it must inform the
175. Id. at 21.
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Parties of what is going on.193 For creating awareness, it uses such means as information
kits and slide projections.'94 The Secretariat also processes knowledge and feeds it into
the negotiation process.195 In fact, even the UNEP Ozone Unit was involved in knowl-
edge dissemination to all the stakeholders during the negotiation of the Vienna
Convention.196
The CITES Secretariat has expertise that it uses on various occasions, such as changes
of governments.' 97 It holds (re)training programmes for national officers every time a
government changes, especially in Africa and Latin America.' 98 Because formal commu-
nications can be difficult at such a time, the Secretariat uses means such as fax and tele-
phone to keep in touch with the state and non-state actors.199 Thus, the Secretariat has
the infrastructure and knowledge to guide new officials.20 Furthermore, it has regional
centres employing specialists who can disseminate expert knowledge. 201 It has also rec-
ommended to governments not to change the head of the CITES Management Authority
as s/he has invaluable expertise 202 that could impact the actions of stakeholders. The Sec-
retariat also uses its technical expertise to conduct analyses of national reports to advise
and recommend actions to be taken. 203
The CITES Secretariat must also convince members of the importance of conservation,
which is difficult in the case of developing countries. 204 In this case, it uses an anthropo-
centric approach,205 helping the countries to develop alternatives to wildlife trading for
their locals.206 The Humane Society, an NGO, termed the CITES Secretariat as very
influential because it provides reliable data, detects infractions, and advises Parties.207
Generally, the recommendations made by the Secretariat are not ignored by the Parties.
In fact, the Secretariat enjoys authority due to its professional expertise and experience.
B. NoRmAT-VE EFFECTS
The UNFCCC Secretariat has not exercised much visible influence on the political
outcome of negotiations or on the adoption of specific measures by Parties. 208 It did not
have much influence on the direction and content of the negotiations leading to the adop-
tion of the Kyoto Protocol either. Despite this, one can say that the Secretariat exercised
indirect influence because it facilitated the negotiations leading to a successful outcome by
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providing strategic advice to the COP President and respective Chairs and officers.209
This was particularly evident at the resumed COP 6 in Bonn in July 2001, where the
Secretariat drafted a text that assisted the Parties in deciding on the technical features of
the Kyoto mechanisms and then adopting the Marrakech Accords at COP 7 in Marrakech
in November 2001.210 The Secretariat did not lean one way or the other, politically, in
the text but instead it merely removed incoherence in the previous texts and provided
technical solutions. 211 The Secretariat can only step in once the Parties are in political
agreement and cannot push forward questions on which Parties are in disagreement. 212
This kind of support for negotiations and technical advice is highly appreciated by the
Parties.213
One of the reasons why secretariats might have a limited influence is because of the
high costs of regulation in domestic economies and the high political stakes. 214 In such a
case parties monitor the activities of the secretariat to make sure they are not acting
against parties' respective interests and are reluctant to give any latitude to the secretariat
to act.215 The Climate Secretariat, for instance, cannot take a stand in the documentation
it prepares and must reflect the positions of all Parties. 216 The Secretariat can only make
technical propositions and cannot comment on politically sensitive issues. 217 Even though
this may be called an exercise in impartiality, taking a stand does not necessarily amount to
partiality.
This does not mean that the Secretariat does not exercise any influence, however; as
this article has noted, its influence is limited but it does exist. 218 The source of its influ-
ence is its political and technical expertise on climate change issues and its ability to pro-
vide input in a timely manner. For example, the Secretariat prepares technical papers for
subsidiary bodies. Given that it is an authority on the climate regime, it can come up with
the requisite analysis of issues critical to the negotiations.219 Thus the Secretariat pos-
sesses expertise unmatched in national jurisdictions and prepares its documents in a politi-
cally neutral way so that such documents are acceptable to the Parties when
negotiating. 220 It prepares, on request, drafts and proposals for the presiding officers that
contain options for agreement amongst Parties, advice on the conduct of negotiations,
possible outcomes, negotiating arena, procedural obstacles, and ways to overcome
them. 221 In fact, the COP at The Hague failed largely due to lack of secretarial advice.222
This shows the significance of the Secretariat's advisory function. The Secretariat also
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provides the logistics in the form of organising negotiations. 22 3 This is a very important
function because climate change negotiations involve a large number of participants. 224
According to a staff member, "[n]o meeting ever succeeded because the logistics were
great. But if the logistics are bad, the negotiations can fail." 225
In the case of the UNCCD Secretariat, its staff members were involved in the negotia-
tions of the Convention, especially the former Executive Secretary, Hama Arba Diallo,
who led the interim Secretariat. 226 The continuity of their presence contributed to the
institutionalisation and implementation of the Convention. Because the Convention itself
contains regional annexes, the Secretariat's efforts, through its Regional Action
Facilitators, are oriented towards Africa, Asia, and Latin America, the affected regions. 227
The Secretariat has aimed to improve cooperation between regions through Regional Co-
ordination Units (RCUs) to implement regional action plans.228 The affected countries
were receptive to the idea of institutionalisation of the Convention but donor countries
were sceptical about it.229 Another example of institutionalisation of the Convention by
the Secretariat is the creation of the Committee for the Review of the Implementation of
the Convention (CRIC).230 This idea originated from within the Secretariat just like the
idea to set up RCUs.23 1 The creation of the CRIC was not looked upon favourably by the
donor countries, similar to the case of the formation of RCUs. 232 Additionally, there were
some irregularities regarding the election of CRIC officials, which affected the reputation
of the Secretariat. 233 When the CRIC held its meetings, however, this scepticism partially
evaporated because it helped to implement the Convention's objectives.234
Not satisfied with its previous efforts towards the institutionalisation of the Convention,
the Secretariat continued in the same direction by organising a High Level Segment of
Heads of State and Government at the Havana COP to get public attention for the Con-
vention. 235 It invited Heads of State of developing countries such as Fidel Castro, Robert
Mugabe, and Hugo Chivez. 236 In contrast, it did not invite any Heads of State from
developed countries. 237 This Segment even resulted in a Havana Declaration of Heads of
States and Governments.238 All these activities show the Secretariat's consistent support
for the developing world. The developed countries expressed their displeasure at the ac-
tivities of the Secretariat.239 Developing countries, being at the mercy of rich donor coun-
tries, also criticised the Secretariat for holding the Segment. This led to the Parties
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exercising greater control over the activities and resources of the Secretariat.240 However,
the very fact that the Segment ignited so much controversy shows the important role
secretariats are capable of playing in the sphere of intergovernmental diplomacy.
Since the UNCCD negotiations began at the Rio de Janeiro Summit in 1992, the Con-
vention has been framed as a sustainable development convention aimed at alleviating
poverty, a point highlighted by the Secretariat and developing members. 241 Given that it
is supposed to be a desertification convention, this framing leads to a certain amount of
ambiguity in its objectives. 242 This ambiguity gives a lot of liberty to the Secretariat,
which prefers a broad interpretation of the Convention.243 In fact, this ambiguity helped
the Secretariat to shape the current Convention process. 244 Given that desertification
affects developing countries much more than developed countries, the Convention is not
of much interest to the latter. Therefore, the developing countries perceive the Secreta-
riat's support as a positive factor.245 On the one hand, the Secretariat could be said to be
faithful to the objectives of the treaty, but on the other hand, this pro-developing country
attitude may put a question mark on the impartial character of the Secretariat. This is a
case of the Secretariat deciding which of the two masters it wants to serve-the treaty
(since the title of the convention refers to Africa) or the parties or both.
The CBD Secretariat has generated substantial normative effects compared with other
secretariats. 246 Its effects result from international cooperation and assistance in negotia-
tions. 247 In fact, because the Secretariat has expert knowledge of the biodiversity regime
(as we have seen in addressing its cognitive effects) and is neutral, it is able to generate
normative effects beyond its mandate. 248 For example, the Secretariat held dialogues on
the issue of biosafety and encouraged Parties to participate in the negotiationS249 despite
their conflicting priorities. As a result, a lot of countries participated in the negotiations
on the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, leading to its successful adoption. 250 Also, the
Convention has an inclusive approach towards non-state actors unlike other conven-
tions.251 This inclusive approach is also the result of the efforts of the Secretariat, which
supported the inclusion of indigenous and local communities in the working group on
traditional knowledge. 252 The Secretariat's role in encouraging NGO participation in the
regime has been highlighted by a majority of stakeholders. 253 Additionally, the Secretariat
prepares background documents for the meetings of the COP and other subsidiary bodies
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to technical assessments have been adopted without any changes.255 Of course, drafts
prepared by the Secretariat are frequently amended when the issue in question is politi-
cally sensitive. 256 On the whole, it is clear that the Secretariat exercises bureaucratic au-
thority and is able to bring about a change in the activities of the different stakeholders. 257
The Ozone Secretariat, like the Climate Secretariat, drafts reports and decisions to be
adopted by the MOP.258 Though the Executive Secretary attached little importance to
the Secretariat's drafts, the staff admits that its legal and technical expertise helps it to
indirectly influence the members' decisions because members view the drafts as reliable. 259
Secretariat staff rephrases potentially controversial parts in drafts to make them acceptable
to delegates. 260 This expertise, which results from a highly qualified, sincere, and profes-
sional staff, allows the Secretariat to command considerable authority.261 Apart from the
preparation of drafts, the Secretariat has also come up with solutions in case of collapse of
negotiations due to politically sensitive issues. 262 The Secretariat also tries to convince
Parties to ratify amendments to the Montreal Protocol as the number of members to the
Convention, the Protocol, and its amendments are different thus increasing the work of
the Secretariat. 263 Its mandate allows it to invite non-members to meetings. 264 It also
communicates to the Parties any proposed Protocol to be adopted, at least six months
before the COP meeting for its adoption (article 8(2) of the Vienna Convention). 265 It is
also required to communicate proposed amendments to the Convention or Protocol to
the Parties at least six months before the COP or MOP meeting for its adoption The
Secretariat shall also communicate proposed amendments to the signatories to this Con-
vention for information (article 9(2) of the Vienna Convention).266 Thus, the Secretariat
plays an important role in improvements and advances in the treaty, be it the Vienna
Convention or the Montreal Protocol. Moreover, the Secretariat is known to be impartial
and transparent and has been able to create good relations with developing and developed
members. 267 This certainly helps in furthering the treaty regime.
The CITES Secretariat has had diverse normative effects. It receives proposed amend-
ments to the Appendices from the Parties 150 days before the meeting to discuss them. It
is then required to consult the Parties and intergovernmental bodies on the issue and
forward the response to the other Parties with its own findings and recommendations
(article XV(1)(a) and (2)(b),(c),(e)). This is unlike the Ozone Secretariat that only com-
municates the proposed amendments to the Convention or Protocol. In case of Parties'
replies or objections, the Secretariat shall communicate them to the other Parties (article
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XV(2)(h)). The Secretariat is also required to notify the Parties of the result of the vote
on the proposed amendment (article XV(2)(k)). Thus it plays a role in treaty-making.
In case of conflicts among members, the CITES Secretariat being activist sees them as
an opportunity to make use of its conflict management skills, thus enhancing its credibility
and reputation as an impartial secretariat.268 Of course the resolution of the conflict must
also result in advancing the objectives of the Convention. 269 The Secretariat's expertise in
resolving conflicts is well known because it is called upon to resolve conflicts between
member states and NGOs, for example, during the negotiation of the Lusaka Agreement
which led to a successful outcome. 270 However Parties do not really acknowledge the
contribution of the Secretariat in resolving conflicts relating to the implementation of the
treaty. 271
The question of ivory trade has caused much tension between the Parties and the Secre-
tariat because the latter advised the parties to enter a reservation on protection of ele-
phants until they were in a position to be protected. 272 The Secretariat knew this
recommendation would be problematic because Parties do not appreciate this recommen-
dation-making power as they feel that the Secretariat has too much liberty to make rec-
ommendations. 273 So the unique power to make recommendations does not always work
in favour of the Secretariat. 274 However, when the Secretariat recommended to the
Standing Committee to take action against Italy for violation of CITES regulations, the
members actually imposed trade bans on Italy, making it comply. 275 In case of trade in
endangered species in Thailand, the Secretariat recommended more time for implementa-
tion. Thailand worked with the Secretariat and thus avoided sanctions.276 Thus, the
CITES Secretariat is not just a servant of the Parties. It also helps in fulfilling the objec-
tives of the Convention. These three examples make it clear the CITES Secretariat is
quite activist even though it may not always succeed in its efforts. But this activism is
actually the result of a formal mandate to make recommendations. Moreover, the Secre-
tariat prepares projects on Parties' request and makes recommendations to the Standing
Committee about which of these should be funded and has also recommended the use of
trade bans against defaulting members. 277
Relations between the Secretariat and NGOs deteriorated in the 1980s when the latter
accused the Secretary General of favouring ivory trade. 278 The Secretariat reacted in a
very mature way. It did not stop communicating with the NGOs. This has an impact on
the achievement of the goals of the treaty. This also explains why the Secretariat is good
at handling conflicts that ultimately leads to furthering the Convention. The fact that
these efforts of the Secretariat bear fruit is proof of its commitment to the Convention.
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The number of Parties to the CITES was twenty-one in 1973 and 134 in 1996.279 This
increase was due to the activism of the CITES Secretariat that made efforts to convince
developing and developed countries to become members of the treaty.280 These efforts
have continued and the number of Parties currently is 175.281 Additionally, the Secreta-
riat has made efforts to include plants under regulated species as the Convention is seen as
one that is too focussed on animals.282 This is a very significant contribution to the ad-
vancement of the Convention. The Secretariat is also respected by all for being impartial.
There are many factors that affect the performance of secretariats, such as cooperation
with other entities, finances, and leadership, to name a few. For example, if the cost of
alleviating the problem is very high or the time span between the cause and effect of the
problem is too long, governments may try to reduce the role of treaty secretariats. 283
However, the authority exercised by secretariats by virtue of their institutional memory,
varied knowledge base, professional diversity, and leadership allows them to play a role in
the functioning of the treaty.284 One of the most important factors affecting the role of
secretariats is their leadership.
VII. Leadership
Leadership is a phenomenon that elicits divergent opinions. On the one hand, scholars
like Thomas G. Weiss feel that the role of leadership in international organisations is
exaggerated because leaders function within an inherently complex structure and are not
always free to make decisions. 285 On the other hand, there are scholars like Oran R.
Young who feel that the success or failure of institutional bargaining in international or-
ganisations depends on the leadership. 2 86 He defines leadership as "the actions of individ-
uals who endeavour to solve or circumvent the collective action problems that plague the
efforts of parties seeking to reap joint gains in processes of institutional bargaining."28 7 It
is thus clear that leaders, in isolation, cannot determine the success of institutional bar-
gaining but good leadership can go a long way in achieving success. 288 This article sub-
scribes to Oran R. Young's view about the importance of the role of leadership.
The functions and impacts of secretariats are greatly determined by their leaders. The
main actors in secretariats are the top executives, especially the head of the organisation
who guides the staff. Skilful leadership allows the secretariat to have more impact. The
personality and abilities of the head are very important when forging relationships with
the parties and other intergovernmental organisations. S/he must maintain informal ties
with the relevant persons without sacrificing the impartiality of the secretariat. The point
of view of the leader regarding the role of the secretariat in treaty implementation deter-
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mines the role the secretariat will play in the treaty regime. The leadership determines
the performance of the secretariat and how it is perceived by the stakeholders. In fact, the
behaviour of the head can have an impact on the behaviour of the stakeholders in the
entire regime.
The UNFCCC Secretariat does not project itself as the leader. Even though the Exec-
utive Secretary can provide some sort of "inspirational leadership," 289 the first Executive
Secretary of the Climate Change Secretariat, Michael Zammit Cutajar, did not want overt
involvement of the Secretariat staff in the climate regime. 290 The staff does not make any
effort to influence the political activity and is aware that this would contradict its man-
date.291 Thus, the Secretariat does not exercise proactive leadership. Staff members stay
impartial by following the instructions of the Parties and this in turn helps the Secretariat
influence the regime. 292 The Secretariat enjoys the trust of the Parties. This is due to
Michael Zammit Cutajar, who having worked in the UNCTAD previously 293 had good
knowledge of UN procedures and of developing country concerns. He served for over a
decade as Executive Secretary, 294 gaining the confidence of Parties through his good rela-
tions. He was known to be efficient, objective, intelligent, committed, professional, and
affable. The next Executive Secretary, Joke Waller Hunter followed in his footsteps, i.e.
she managed to keep the trust of the Parties.
The UJNCCD Secretariat's leadership has been instrumental in bringing about institu-
tionalisation and implementation of the Convention. The former Executive Secretary
Hama Arba Diallo from Burkina Faso was head of the Secretariat of the Intergovernmen-
tal Negotiating Committee on Desertification and of the interim Secretariat. He was
popular with developing countries.295 He played an important role in the negotiation of
the Convention and was known to take a stand against developed members.296 The cur-
rent Executive Secretary is Luc Gnacadja from Benin.297 This could be symbolic as deser-
tification mainly affects Africa.298 This may also show the preference for an Executive
Secretary who comes from the affected region and so has a good grasp of the problem.
The effects of the CBD Secretariat can be explained by the functioning of its leadership.
For example, the Executive Secretary proposed a Staff Development Policy adopted by
the COP in 2002 which encourages staff to improve and evaluate its competencies. 299
This obviously helps in better functioning of the Secretariat and thus of the treaty regime.
The first Executive Secretary of the CBD Secretariat, Calestous Juma, had frequent con-
flicts with the UJNEP because he wanted more autonomy for the Secretariat. 300 Since the
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CBD Secretariat is hosted by the UNEP, any attempt to break away does not make sense.
As long as the Secretariat can fulfil its mandate, whether or not it is autonomous is not
really the question. But these efforts at autonomy did bear fruit because the next Execu-
tive Secretary, Hamdallah Zedan, who was from the UNEP itself, took the reins of a
rather independent Secretariat. 30 Moreover, he did not let UNEP exercise any further
control on the Secretariat and instead favoured more autonomy.302 He also favoured con-
sulting his staff when taking decisions, thus bringing about a change in the centralised
decision-making procedure that existed earlier. 303 The current Executive Secretary Ah-
med Djoghlaf has emphasised capacity building and implementation as areas requiring
further action.304 Thus, it is clear that the leadership has contributed to the useful effects
of the Secretariat.
Despite the fact that all the Executive Secretaries of the UNCCD and CBD Secretariats
have been from developing countries, the difference in the stand of the two Secretariats is
obvious. The UNCCD Secretariat is manifestly pro-developing countries whereas the
CBD Secretariat is impartial.
The role played by the Ozone Secretariat is reinforced by its leadership. Mustafa Tolba,
Executive Director of UNEP, was very overtly involved in the ozone negotiations and is
respected for having furthered the formation of the ozone regime. 305 All the stakeholders,
including staff and delegates, are unanimously appreciative of his leadership capabilities.
His successor, Madhava Sarma, the first Executive Secretary of the Ozone Secretariat, was
also respected by all the parties. 306 Like Mustafa Tolba, who played an important role in
the Vienna Convention and Montreal Protocol negotiations, Sarma also played a signifi-
cant role in resolving impasses at the sessions of the MOP to amend the Montreal Proto-
col. 307 Both would consult informally with Parties before the beginning of formal
negotiations to achieve consensus. 308 Marco Gonzalez, the current Executive Secretary, is
more prudent in his approach to the Parties309 but understands fully well the conse-
quences of Parties not willing to commit in negotiations. According to him, even though
the Secretariat is meant to serve the Parties, it also reminds them of their responsibili-
ties.310 Also, the fact that the Ozone Secretariat processes knowledge that is used in infor-
mal meetings of the Parties shows not only its expertise but also the dynamism of its
leadership. The role of the personnel and the leadership is commendable given the lim-
ited autonomy of the Secretariat being part of the UNEP. Additionally, the Executive
Secretary has to make do with a very small staff.3 1"
The leadership of the CITES Secretariat has had a turbulent history. The achieve-
ments of the Secretariat, however, are a testimony of its commitment to the Convention.
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tary General, Eugine Lapointe, of receiving payments from ivory traders, because of
which he was dismissed by Mustafa Tolba, the then Executive Director of UNEP.312 The
Secretariat staff is sympathetic to Lapointe and are now cautious in their relations with
NGOs. In 1998, Izgrev Topkov, the then Secretary General, was also removed from his
post, along with two other officers, for awarding permits to organisations that wanted to
trade in banned plants and animals. This was the result of an inquiry by Klaus Tpfer,
Executive Director of UNEP.
The Secretariat has also had many problems with the TNEP over common services and
costs of being located in Geneva. 313 In 1995, the Secretary-General Izgrev Topkov sug-
gested that the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) that was acting as
the CITES Secretariat had not put in enough effort to make their alliance work, because
of which the parties decided to move it to the UNEP.314 But there were problems with
the UNEP too and according to Topkov, since the Secretariat had been through this with
IUCN, it knew that bowing to UNEP would spell the end of its autonomy. 31s Thus, he
could be said to be like Calestous Juma, the first Executive Secretary of the CBD Secreta-
riat, who was very concerned about the independence of his Secretariat. Given the strong
personality of its head, it is not surprising that the CITES Secretariat is quite active.
Furthermore, Topkov realised that employees were underpaid and on short-term con-
tracts.316 He therefore secured them longer contracts. 317 He believed that he could not
win the loyalty of the staff if he did not take care of it. It is curious that the CITES
Secretariat has such a bad relationship with UNEP, unlike the Ozone Secretariat. And
Mustafa Tolba buckled under U.S. pressure to dismiss Lapointe. Perhaps, this is just one
reason explaining the bad relationship between the UNEP and the CITES Secretariat.
What is really surprising is that the Secretariat is so active despite its controversial
leadership.
Lapointe's generation was dedicated to the protection of the environment. The new
generation of leaders is more concerned about the efficiency of the Secretariat,318 as is
clear by Topkov's attitude. But this attitude cannot be criticised per se because it must be
judged by what it achieves in terms of the Convention's objectives. The Secretariat has
played a role in resolving conflicts amongst members, as mentioned earlier. Its senior
officers, such as the Secretary General, Deputy Secretary-General, and the Scientific Of-
ficer have facilitated negotiations among members. 319 Therefore, they are highly re-
garded by all the stakeholders. 320 Additionally, the Secretary General is also responsible
for the budget of the Secretariat. 321
This overview proves that leaders of environmental secretariats have made a significant
contribution to the functioning of secretariats and, as a result, on the impact of secretariats
on the treaty regime.
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VIII. Problems Faced by Environmental Secretariats
One problem faced by secretariats is the issue of sovereignty, i.e. the parties and not the
secretariats are the decision-makers. 322 Parties can do anything in the name of sover-
eignty. Also, different departments or ministries of the government have different priori-
ties so secretariats get different signals from the same government. 323 For example, the
Ministry of Trade will promote trade, whereas the Ministry of Forests will promote con-
servation.324 Moreover, changes in national governments mean changes in national pri-
orities and new government officials must be briefed every time. 325 If a new government
changes its priority from environment to education, the secretariat can only advance the
goal of the treaty within this change in priority. Within this constraint, the secretariat has
to try to achieve the treaty objectives so it constantly communicates with parties' govern-
ments, providing relevant information, etc. The secretariat may also cooperate with
NGOs as they can mobilise opinion that may influence the implementation of the conven-
tion by a party. This is certainly useful if the convention is not a priority for the new
government. Secretariats may also build contacts with the media for this purpose.
Another problem is finances. With the passage of time, the number of parties to trea-
ties has gone up, thus increasing the workload and financial needs of secretariats. When
parties want to restrain the expansion of secretariats, they may use budget constraints. 326
This may be the case if parties do not want the secretariat to play a role in compliance
monitoring, for example, by travelling and verifying implementation by parties. Moreo-
ver, parties are reluctant to provide funds for implementation problems as that would
amount to admitting their existence. 327 Therefore, secretariats are hesitant to ask for
funds. The CITES Secretariat faced this problem and had to ask for funds stating that
they were for the performance of substantive tasks.328 Also, parties may not pay their
contributions in a timely manner, forcing the secretariat to do fund-raising from their
parent organisation or external sources such as NGOs, which is time consuming and may
put its neutrality at risk. But this is not a substitute for parties' contributions. Addition-
ally, lack of funds may not let the secretariat employ quality staff.329 In this case the work
is outsourced to consultants or even NGOs. But in the face of changing governments,
continuity is required in the secretariat staff. Therefore, secretariats try to obtain contri-
butions from important members first and then persuade other members to pay.
Some parties may feel the secretariat is too active and may try to restrain its activities.
But in fact, the secretariats do not overstep their limits as they have their survival in mind.
Anyway, staff cannot be hired without COP approval. Also, the parties are sometimes
suspicious of the activities of the secretariat. For example, the parties to the UJNFCCC
never analysed the financial activities of the Secretariat, but have started doing so now.330
Additionally, the programme budget decision for 2004-2005 requested the Executive Sec-
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retary to specify how COP decisions on article 4(8) of the UNFCCC331 are reflected in
the work programme and to conduct an evaluation of the Secretariat's activities and report
to the COP 11. Moreover, Saudi Arabia, speaking for G77 and China, asked for a contin-
uing review of the functions and operations of the Secretariat. This close supervision of
the Secretariat may be useful if it is not done for political purposes. 332
Parties do not appreciate the presence of NGOs in their jurisdictions.333 For example,
there are northern NGOs which monitor trade in Asia and Africa and report to the
CITES Secretariat to identify infractions.33 4 Frequently, the NGOs are more interested
in making money and have little understanding of the problem or culture of the issue in
question. 335 Moreover, developing countries do not always have the resources to put into
practice all the rules of the Conventions, and NGOs do not understand this. 336 There-
fore, secretariats play a role in improving relations between the stakeholders. But, because
secretariats are dependent on NGOs for fieldwork, their dislike by the parties may not
allow the secretariat to fulfil its monitoring obligation.
National governments try to exert pressure on their nationals to influence the course of
action in the secretariats. 337 This means that geographical quotas may lead to interna-
tional civil servants promoting national interests within the international secretariat. 338 In
fact, the very concept of geographical quotas supports the idea of national loyalties and
may lead to the non-fulfilment of the international objectives of the MEA.339 Thus, these
quotas should be eliminated. Instead, they could be based on gender, age, length of ser-
vice, etc., or a mix of these criteria.340 Or recruitment could be done in such a way that it
is representative of all stakeholders, for example indigenous peoples, involved in the man-
agement of the resource to be protected. 341 An example of geographical quotas not serv-
ing their purpose is provided by the UNFCCC Secretariat, where developing country
nationals are under-represented in the top management. 342 As a result, China and G77
have questioned this and asked for equity in allocation of resources between developed
and developing members.343 If the principle of geographical quotas were not followed,
this question would not have arisen.
Secretariats may also face problems with respect to their parent organisation, like the
CITES Secretariat has had problems with UNEP. But this conflict related to the field of
activity of the Secretariat under the purview the UNEP, i.e. administrative matters, and
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not to the field of substantive operations of the Secretariat that are the domain of the
COP. Despite this, the secretariat has to spend time dealing with it.
The location of the secretariat can also create problems. For example, the CITES Sec-
retariat may conduct activities such as training programmes in developing countries.344
But it is located in Geneva and it may be difficult to coordinate from there. It has regional
centres3 45 but this is not the case with all secretariats. The Ozone Secretariat is located in
a developing country but then far away from the UN in Geneva or New York, so coordi-
nation is again a problem. 346 Also, developing countries do not always have missions in
another developing country so they cannot send delegates, especially on short notice. On
the other hand, they have missions in UN centres so they can attend meetings easily.
Given that most secretariats are in the North, it may be a good idea to decentralise activi-
ties by having regional centres where representatives of various secretariats may partici-
pate. Because environmental problems are linked, a forum is needed where all the
environmental secretariats can interact, which would be beneficial to the attainment of the
goals of the various treaties involved. Regional centres make the secretariat more accessi-
ble to stakeholders and help the secretariat to monitor compliance. Furthermore, decen-
tralisation would make their operations more flexible and decisions could be taken faster
without the need for consulting the entire management. In addition, decentralised offices,
being in the field, understand the problem better and can initiate useful projects that
would fulfill the aims of the MEA. Of course, decentralisation leads to higher costs but
has many advantages too.347 The decentralised units can continue to be financed by the
main office or may generate their own finances also. Another possibility may be to locate
secretariats, whether or not by rotation, in places where the problem to be addressed is
most acute because people there have greater understanding of the issue and need more
help.34 8
IX. Conclusion
This analysis of secretariats shows that they do play an important role in the treaty
regime. Despite the fact that they lack formal power, they help in ensuring the success of
the treaty and can have a significant impact on the international environmental policy
outcomes. They do so by impacting the behaviour of states and non-state actors. For
example, despite criticism and accusations of lack of transparency, the UNCCD Secreta-
riat has emerged as an active player in the regime. Of course, secretariats cannot be held
responsible for the failure or success of the regimes as they are but secretariats. They are
not the decision-makers. But they can lead to unpredictable results that impact the imple-
mentation of the MvEA. The principal role is played by the nation states, but secretariats
are fast becoming quite influential even if such influence is not laid down in their man-
date. States frequently react to secretariats' actions, as in the case of the UNCCD Secre-
tariat. As a result, it is clear that secretariats exercise bureaucratic authority. But, this
authority should be exercised judiciously. For example, the blatant support of developing
344. Sandford, snpra note 36, at 22.
345. Id. at 252.
346. SANDFORD, supra note 8, at 22-27.
347. Weiss, supra note 1, at 302, n. 36.
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members by the UNCCD Secretariat has proved counterproductive by offending power-
ful donor countries.
Secretariats offset their little formal power by acting as the information hub and provid-
ing the link between states and non-state actors. Moreover, the influence of secretariats is
also dependent on their leadership. Being the institutional memory of the regime and the
main expert on technical, scientific, legal, and political matters, secretariats are actually
indispensable. Parties' appreciation of their work is proof of this fact.
The most important function of secretariats is actually acting as the facilitator and me-
diator, especially the latter. This means that the most important function is the one that is
not really defined in its mandate. This once again proves their importance. Of course,
the other functions are equally indispensable, but the effects of acting as a mediator can be
quite spectacular; for example, the adoption of the Convention or Protocol.
If secretariats are to continue their important work, their problems need to be solved.
They need to be provided with funds and basic autonomy so that they do not spend their
time searching for either or both.
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